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Dienes’s (2016) article is one of the contributions to the special issue “Bayes factors for testing
hypotheses in psychological research...” being published by the Journal of Mathematical Psychology.
It is the article most accessible to non-Bayesians, offering a good understanding of Jeffreys’s data
testing approach (Bayes factors) with little in the form of mathematical expressions.
Dienes’s main argument is one of best-fit-for-purpose: the Bayes factor pits the probability of
the data under one hypothesis against that under another on equal ground, providing a symmetric
assessment—the data may favor either hypothesis, or neither—as a continuous measure of evidence
in the form of odds. For Dienes, Jeffreys’s (1961) approach is, if not perfect, at least superior to those
of Fisher’s (1954) tests of significance and of Neyman and Pearson’s (1933) tests of acceptance.
Unlike Bayes factors, Fisher’s approach only tests data under a null hypothesis so that the resulting
p-value is asymmetric, capable of providing evidence against such hypothesis but not in its favor.
Neyman–Pearson’s approach, on the other hand, uses two hypotheses and allows some ground
for asserting either if the power of the test is adequate; however, it is not evidential insofar it has
little use for sample statistics such as p-values and post-hoc power. Therefore, not only the use of
Bayes factors is a much better approach for testing research data but such use will also “help solve
some...of the problems leading to the credibility crisis” (p. ii) posed by the latter two approaches.
One concern I have with Dienes’s article is its “one-size-fits-all” philosophy. Allow me to argue
the point using non-research affairs, which seemmore relatable. Most (if not all) of us have certainly
been in the position of having to choose between valuable alternatives, pitting one against the
other and selecting that which came on top. Such positions may range from the serious— “Which
cancer treatment to choose, radiotherapy or surgery?”—to the rather banal—“Coffee or tea?”
However, there are times when decisions do not need, nor benefit from, such pitting among defined
alternatives. “Do I have a temperature?” is a question that calls for assessing data against a known
cut-off that rejects the normal hypothesis in favor of the sick hypothesis without the need to test
the latter. There are also many times when decisions are based on assessing just a single model in
reference to standards of its own and not in relation to alternative hypotheses, such as deciding
whether we are enjoying our lunch or whether we are happy with our lives.
Furthermore, there are occasions in which any of the three methods may be used depending
on how the situation comes to us. For it is possible for the same person to decide to divorce if
a comparatively better person comes along one day, as it is for him or her to divorce only after
high thresholds of regret between omission and commission have been breached in a long-run of
mulling over the possibilities, as it is to divorce for reasons other than the existence of alternatives
(e.g., because the person has just been abused by her or his current partner).
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Most research in psychology fit well the aims of a test
of significance, especially in regards to null hypotheses been
uninteresting models which serve only the purpose of offering an
exact distribution against which to test the research data at hand.
For if one is just interested in the significance of a treatment (as
in its practical importance using small samples, Perezgonzalez,
2015a), what is to be gained from supporting the null? The
situation would certainly be different if one were interested in
both, for example because ineffective treatments could be used as
placebo in future research projects or because the null represents
a general law (Jeffreys, 1961; also Robert, 2016). In the latter cases,
a null model is equally interesting and Bayes factors relevant.
Thus, I find it naive that a single approach is still proposed as
the one and only tool for testing data. It is true that a research
question may be adapted to suit a particular tool but this does
not guarantee that such tool will address the research question
correctly.
A second concern is the reification of Bayes factors as the
solution to the credibility crisis. The thing is, it is not just a
single research which will solve the crisis but replication (also,
R-Index, 2015, 2016). Interestingly enough, Fisher advocated the
accumulation of evidence (thus, hinting to cumulative meta-
analysis, e.g., Braver et al., 2014), while Neyman–Pearson’s
approach calls for an acceptable proportion of direct replications
in long-run sequences (Perezgonzalez, 2015b). Jeffreys’s approach
sits within the updating philosophy of Bayes–Laplace’s formula,
yet replicability is rarely emphasized by Bayes factors proponents
(e.g., Dienes, 2016; Ly et al., 2016; Morey et al., 2016).
And this latter concern brings me back to the title of
the special issue because a Bayes factor is that part of the
Bayes-Laplace formula that deals with the probability of the
data under each hypothesis excluding the prior probabilities
of the hypotheses themselves. This puts Bayes factors at the
same level as Fisher’s p-values and Neyman–Pearson’s error
decisions (which may partly explain why “in spite of the
difference in principle between my tests and those based on
the p integrals...it appears that there is no much difference in
the practical recommendations,” Jeffreys, 1961, p. 435). Bayes
factors proponents do not usually address how replicability is
to be managed—and those who do mostly rely on frequentist
statistics by tallying the Bayes factors of individual studies (e.g.,
Wagenmakers et al., 2011), calculating the Bayes factors of
frequentist meta-analyses (e.g., Etz, 2015), or calculating the
Bayes factors of test statistics (e.g., Rouder and Morey, 2011).
Thus, I also find it naive to assume that Bayes factors, with no
clear replicability mechanism attached to them, are the ones to
resolve the credibility crisis in psychology.
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